题目：On the Razor’s Edge：How SEC-Connected Directors React to Restatements
时间：2024年12月6日（周五）10:00-11:30
地点：浙江大学紫金港校区yl23411永利A423
主讲人：高茹，华中科技大学yl23411永利教授
主持人：吴依，yl23411永利百人计划研究员
主讲人简介：
高茹，华中技大学yl23411永利教授，博士生导师，大数据审计和监管研究中心主任，会计与财税系副主任，美国会计协会（AAA）会员，澳大利亚会计金融协会（AFAANZ）会员，澳大利亚注册会计师协会(CPA)会员，澳大利亚与新西兰特许会计师协会（CA ANZ）会员。曾在2000-2007年期间在华中科技大学取得会计学本科、外国文学双学士、会计学硕士和国际贸易双硕士学位。2011年在新南威尔士大学（QS世界排名19）攻读博士学位，于2014年获得会计学博士学位。先后在澳大利亚新南威尔士大学和昆士兰大学任教，并获得昆士兰大学（QS世界排名43）终身教职。她长期致力于金融市场监管的研究，近些年特别关注大数据、机器学习、人工智能技术在监管中的应用。在Contemporary Accounting Research、Journal of Business Ethics、Accounting and Finance等期刊发表多篇文章。获得澳大利亚与新西兰 Philip Brown奖、昆士兰大学最佳科研奖、美国会计师协会国际会计分部奖、广东省现代化创新二等奖。
摘要：
This study investigates how SEC-connected directors influence the likelihood of regulatory investigations following potential corporate misconduct. Using a sample of firms that announce financial restatements, we find that firms with SEC-connected independent directors are more likely to be investigated by the SEC. However, we do not observe the same effect for SEC-connected executive directors or independent directors with SEC connections in regions outside the firm’s primary regulatory jurisdiction. Additionally, while SEC-connected independent directors are associated with a higher likelihood of an SEC investigation, they are not linked to a greater probability of receiving penalties in the form of AAERs. Further analysis shows that firms with SEC-connected independent directors experience fewer internal control weaknesses and improved financial reporting quality after the investigation. Moreover, these directors hold more board positions in publicly listed companies following the investigation. Overall, our findings suggest that the SEC connections of independent directors enhance oversight effectiveness during investigations but also help mitigate severe penalties, leading to improved governance and career outcomes for the directors.
